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ABSTRACT
Partially Observable Stochastic Games (POSGs), are the most gen-
eral model of games used in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
(MARL), modeling actions and observations as happening sequen-
tially for all agents. We introduce Agent Environment Cycle Games
(AEC Games), a model of games based on sequential agent actions
and observations. AEC Games can be thought of as sequential ver-
sions of POSGs, and we prove that they are equally powerful. We
argue conceptually and through case studies that the AEC games
model is useful in important scenarios inMARL for which the POSG
model is not well suited. We additionally introduce “cyclically ex-
pansive curriculum learning,” a new MARL curriculum learning
method motivated by the AEC games model. It can be applied “for
free,” and experimentally we show this technique to achieve up to
35.1% more total reward on average.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The most common model of games in Multi-Agent Reinforcement
Learning (“MARL”) is Partially Observable Stochastic Games (“POSGs”).
In POSGs, all agents take an action simultaneously, then the en-
vironment responds and each agent’s observation updates and it
receives a reward, then all agents act again, and so on [9]. This
paradigm of POSGs and “simultaneous agent action” is ubiquitous
in MARL outside of strictly turn-based games like chess [2, 8, 9, 12].
While agents are modeled as taking actions simultaneously in a
POSG, this is generally slightly untrue in practice. Unless complex
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parallelization techniques are used, in any environment where
multiple agents are interacting, the environment effectively updates
one agent at a time, according to some order.
Accordingly, we introduce the Agent Environment Cycle (“AEC”)
games model. It’s ultimately a sequential version of the parallel
POSG paradigm (and model). In the AEC games model, one agent
acts, then the environment may respond (updating the observa-
tion), then the next agent steps, and so on. The full definition and
mathematical formalization is in section 3. This indefinite cycle of
agent and environment steps is the inspiration for the name.
This model was developed after finding a significant unnoticed
bug in the cleanup environment from Vinitsky et al. [16] and a
significant learning inefficiency in the pursuit environment from
Gupta et al. [6]. Both are very popular MARL environments, and
both issues stemmed from treating the environments as if all agents
stepped simultaneously, when this was not quite the case. They
were very easy mistakes to make that could easily occur in any
MARL environment, were very difficult to find, and could be easily
seen when viewed from a lens of a formal conceptual model of
sequential agent stepping.
We argue that, due to their better match-upwith gamemechanics
in practice and their usefulness in finding and preventing serious
subtle bugs , AEC games are often a superior model to POSGs in
MARL.
Furthermore POSGs, due to treating all agents as acting at once,
are a very inelegant model for viewing strictly turn based games
like chess or Go. Treating an environment that actually steps in
parallel as stepping sequentially isn’t nearly as problematic, so AEC
games provides a clean, unified model for both POSGs and fully
turn based games to be considered with.
Due to these considerations, based on a preprint version of this
work, the AEC games model has been used as the basis of the
API for the PettingZoo library [13]. PettingZoo is a Python library
that’s akin to a multi-agent version of OpenAI’s Gym library [5],
and contains the largest and most diverse collection of multi-agent
environments ever under one API.
In this paper, we conceptually and formally introduce the AEC
games model and prove its equivalence to POSGs in section 3;
we give case studies of the aforementioned bugs in section 4 and
section 5. We additionally introduce a new method of curriculum
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learning termed “cyclically expansive curriculum learning,” that’s
heavily inspired by the AEC games model and can be trivially
applied to any MARL environment. We experimentally show it
achieves up to 35.1% more total reward on average.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning (RL) methods seek to learn a policy (a
function which takes an observation and returns an action) that
achieves the maximum expected discounted reward for a given
environment. Single-agent environments are traditionally modeled
as aMarkov Decision Process (“MDP”) or a partially-observable MDP
(“POMDP”) [4]. An MDP models decision making as a process
where an agent repeatedly takes a single action, receives a reward,
and transitions to a new state (receiving complete knowledge of the
state). A POMDP extends this to include environments where the
agent may not be able to observe the entire state of the environment.
Multi-agent reinforcement learning similarly seeks to learn a set
of optimal policies for each agent in an environment where they
interact. The most basic model of environments is the Multi-agent
MDP (“MMDP”), in which MDPs have multiple agents which act
simultaneously, sharing a single reward function [4]. Decentralized
POMDPs (or “Dec-POMDPs”) add partial observablity toMMDPs [3].
Stochastic Games, sometimes called Markov Games, extend MMDPs
to have a dunique reward function for each agent [11]. Stochastic
games are extended to the partially observable case with Partially
Observable Stochastic Games (“POSGs”), and are the model most
typically used in MARL.
Definition 1. A Partially-Observable Stochastic Game (POSG) is a
tuple ⟨S,N , {Ai }, P , {Ri }, {Ωi }, {Oi }⟩, where:
• S is the set of possible states.
• N is the number of agents. The set of agents is [N ].
• Ai is the set of possible actions for agent i .
• P : S ×∏i ∈[N ]Ai × S → [0, 1] is the transition function. It
has the property that for all s ∈ S, for all (a1,a2, . . . ,aN ) ∈∏
i ∈[N ]Ai ,
∑
s ′∈S P(s,a1,a2, . . . ,aN , s ′) = 1.
• Ri : S×∏i ∈[N ]Ai ×S → R is the reward function for agent
i .
• Ωi is the set of possible observations for agent i .
• Oi : Ai × S × Ωi → [0, 1] is the observation function. It has
the property that
∑
ω ∈Ωi Oi (a, s,ω) = 1 for all a ∈ Ai and
s ∈ S.
2.2 Deep Reinforcement Learning
Deep reinforcement learning (DRL) seeks to learn optimal policies
for RL environments while representing the policy function as a
neural network. This paper uses parameter shared versions of PPO
[10] and Ape-X DQN [7], motivated by the empirical results in
Terry et al. [14] which showed them to perform very well on the
Pursuit environment (described in [6]). Ape-X DQN also regularly
achieves state-of the art performance on discrete graphical games in
general [7], and PPO can often achieve state-of the art performance
and generally requires very little hyperparameter tuning [10].
3 THE AEC GAMES MODEL
3.1 The Model
We begin by defining the model of AEC games in English. The base
component of an AEC game is a changeable list of agents. After
the first agent in the list acts, the environment can “act” (allowing
agents’ observations to be updated), or the next designated agent
can act (skipping environment turns are how truly simultaneous
games are depicted). This process continues indefinitely. In most
games, the agents and the order in which they act don’t change
much, sowe’ve found it very helpful to diagram games as in figures 1
and 2. We call such diagrams “AEC Diagrams.”
As for reward, after every agent takes a turn a partial reward
is emitted to every other agent. The reward for an agent’s action
is the total of all rewards following that action and before the
agent’s next turn (until this point, the reward is not fully defined).
Different aspects of a game will be responsible for different portions
of reward. As shown in Sections 4 and 6, thinking about rewards
in this atomized manner instead of lumping the reward process all
together can be very helpful.
3.2 Mathematical Formalism
Accordingly, we formalize AEC games as follows:
Definition 2. An Agent-Environment Cycle Game (AEC Game) is
a tuple ⟨S,N , {Ai }, {Ti }, P , {Ri }, {Ωi }, {Oi },ν⟩, where:
• S is the set of possible states.
• N is the number of agents. The agents are numbered 1 through
N . There is also an additional “environment” agent, denoted
as agent 0. We denote the set of agents along with the envi-
ronment by Ξ := [N ] ∪ {0}.
• Ai is the set of possible actions for agent i . For convenience,
we further define A0 = {} and A := ⋃i ∈ΞAi . The action
 is a special “null” action which is the only action associated
with the environment. This allows us to use the environment
as an agent in the functions below, which include both an
agent and an action (which is assumed to be part of the given
agent’s action space) as part of the input.
• Ti : S × Ai → S is the transition function for agents. State
transitions for agent actions are deterministic.
• P : S × S → [0, 1] is the transition function for the environ-
ment. State transitions for environment steps are stochastic:
P(s, s ′) is the probability that the environment transitions
into state s ′ from state s .
• Ri is the reward function for agent i . The set of all possible
rewards for each agent is assumed to be finite, which we
denote Ri ⊆ R. We also define R := ⋃i ∈[N ] Ri . Then, the
reward function is Ri : S × Ξ × A × S × Ri → [0, 1]. It is
stochastic: Ri (s, j,a, s ′, r ) is the probability of agent i receiv-
ing reward r when agent j takes action a while in state s , and
the game transitions to state s ′. The function should only
define a nonzero reward Ri (s, j,a, s ′, r ) , 0 when a ∈ Aj .
• Ωi is the set of possible observations for agent i .
• Oi : S × Ωi → [0, 1] is the observation function for agent i .
Oi (s,ω) is the probability of agent i observing ω while in
state s .
Player 1
Environment 1
Player 2
Environment 2
Figure 1: The AEC diagram of Chess
Player 1
Player 2 Environment
Figure 2: The AEC diagram of Chess naively modeled as
a POSG. The missing environment node between Player 1
and Player 2 denotes the simultaneous action as there’s no
state update without an environment step. This diagram
clearly communicates the asymmetry between Player 1 and
Player 2 generated by naively reducing an environment to
a simultaneous action.
• ν : S × Ξ × A × Ξ→ [0, 1] is the next agent function. This
means that ν (s, i,a, j) is the probability that agent j will be
the next agent permitted to act given that agent i has just
taken action a in state s . This should attribute a non-zero
probability only when a ∈ Ai .
With this definition, an AEC Game has a state s0 ∈ S which
is designated as the initial state, with an agent i ∈ Ξ designated
as the first agent to act. The game then evolves in “turns” where
in each turn the game starts in some state s with agent i to act;
agent i receives an observation ωi and then chooses an action
ai ∈ Ai , and the game transitions into a new state s ′; then, a
new agent i ′ is determined who will be the one to act in the next
turn. The observation ωi that is received is random, occurring
with probability Oi (s,ωi ). The new state s ′ is determined by one
of the transition functions: if i = 0, then the current turn is an
“environment step” and the next state s ′ is random, occurring with
probability P(s, s ′); if i > 0, then the new state is deterministically
s ′ = Ti (s,ai ). The next agent i ′ is determined randomly by the next-
agent function, with i ′ being chosen with probability ν (s, i,ai , i ′).
Finally, at every turn, every agent receives some (possibly negative)
reward. In the preceding example, every agent j will receive a
random reward r ′, with probability Rj (s, i,ai , s ′, r ′). In order for the
next-agent and reward functions to be well defined in environment
steps, we use the special action . For example, agent i ′ will be
next to act after an environment step in state s with probability
ν (s, 0,, i ′).
3.3 Equivalence to POSGs
As one would hope, AEC Games are as powerful as POSGs. This
is because every POSG can be converted into an AEC game where
every N + 1 turns of the AEC Game corresponds to one step of
the original POSG (each agent will act exactly once, followed by a
single environment step to resolve the “joint action”).
Theorem 1. For every POSG, there is an equivalent AEC Game.
Proof. Let G = ⟨S,N , {Ai }, P , {Ri }, {Ωi }, {Oi }⟩ be a POSG.
We define an equivalent AEC Game GAEC as follows:
GAEC = ⟨S′,N , {Ai }, {Ti }, P ′, {R′i }, {Ωi }, {Oi },ν⟩
where
• S′ = S × A1 × A2 × · · · × AN . That is, an element of S′
(and thus, any input toTi , P , Ri , orOi representing a state) is
a tuple (s,a1,a2, . . . ,aN ) where s ∈ S and for each i ∈ [N ],
ai ∈ Ai .
• Ti ((s,a1,a2, . . . ,ai , . . . ,aN ),a′i ) = (s,a1,a2, . . . ,a′i , . . . ,aN ).
In this sense, the most recent action of agent i is “embedded”
in the (i + 1)st element of the new state tuple.
• For s = (s,a1,a2, . . . ,aN ) and s′ = (s ′,a1,a2, . . . ,aN ), we
define P ′(s, s′) = P(s,a1,a2, . . . ,aN , s ′). This way, the envi-
ronment step causes the state to transition in the same way
as the original POSG G (ignoring the part of the state tuple
that embeds action information). If s and s′ are such that
ai , a′i for any i ∈ [N ], then P ′(s, s′) = 0.• For s = (s,a1,a2, . . . ,aN ) and s′ = (s ′,a1,a2, . . . ,aN ), and
r = Ri (s,a1,a2, . . . ,aN , s ′), we let R′i (s, 0,, s′, r) = 1. We
define R′i = 0 for all other cases. In this way, the reward for
agent i is emitted only at the environment step, where it
is deterministically equal the original reward for agent i in
the POSG for the same state transitions and joint action (as
embedded in the new state tuple).
• ν ((s,a1,a2, . . . ,aN ), i,a′i , j) = 1 if j ≡ i + 1 (mod N + 1)
(and equals 0 otherwise). In this way, the steps are given
by an unchanging deterministic cycle in which agent i + 1
follows agent i , with the environment (agent 0) taking a step
(causing the first part of the state tuple to transition and a
reward to be emitted to all agents) after the last agent, N ,
takes its action.
The AEC game GAEC begins with agent 1. If the initial state of the
POSGG was s0, then the initial state ofGAEC is (s0, ·, ·, . . . , ·); that is,
all but the first element of the tuple can be chosen arbitrarily. When
agent 1 (more generally, agent i > 0) takes any action a1 (more
generally, action ai ), the (i + 1)st element of the state tuple is set
to a1 (ai ) and all other elements of the tuple are unchanged. Once
agent N for the first time (with action aN ), the state tuple will be
(s0,a1,a2, . . . ,aN ) and the environment will then step. Thus, after
one full cycle (i.e., after the first environment step), the system will
correspond precisely to one step of the original POSG: all agents
will have taken one action, and the state will have transitioned and
rewards will have been emitted to all agents according to their joint
action. Each new cycle of the AEC game corresponds to one step
of the original POSG. Notice that in the environment step of each
cycle, the state transition depends on the full joint action consisting
of each action taken by all agents in the current cycle. The reward
is only nonzero during the environment step, at which point it is
deterministically equal to the original POSG reward given the same
state transition and joint action. □
As youwould also expect, every AECGame can be converted into
a POSG, by using a transition function (in the POSG) which ignores
all components of a joint action except for one, corresponding to
the agent whose turn it is. The details of this construction and
the formal proof that every AEC game has an equivalent POSG is
included in Appendix A. This means that AEC games and POSGs
are truly equivalent.
4 CASE STUDY 1: REWARD PRUNING IN SISL
PURSUIT
Per subsection 3.1, each agent’s reward updates after every other
agent’s turn. Therefore, an agent’s reward is only fully defined right
before it acts again. If some of these sources of reward are unable
to be learned (in theory due to randomness or in practice due to
near-randomness or complexity), it’s plainly superior to “ignore”
those rewards when they’re emitted from the cycle. This can be
thought of as “reward pruning.” This can easily accidentally happen
in a MARL game where reward from many sources are present, and
when all rewards from all sources are bundled together, this proves
very hard to notice or fix.
Figure 3: The pursuit environment from Gupta et al. [6].
Pursuit is a popular MARL benchmark environment from Gupta
et al. [6], shown in Figure 3. In it, 8 red pursuer agents must work
together to surround and capture 30 randomly moving blue evader
agents. The action space of each agent is discrete (cardinal directions
or do nothing), and the observation space is a 7 × 7 box centered
around a pursuer (depicted by the orange box). When an evader is
surrounded on all sides by pursuers or the game boundaries, each
contributing pursuer gets a reward of 5. Pursuers also receive a
reward of 0.01 every time they touch an evader.
In pursuit, pursuers move first, and then evaders move randomly,
before it’s determined if an evader is captured and rewards are
emitted. Thus an evader that “should have” been captured is not
actually captured. Having the evaders move second isn’t a bug: it’s
just way of adding complexity to the classic genre of pursuer/evader
multi-agent environments [15], and is representative of real world
problems. When pursuit is viewed as an AEC game, we’re forced to
attribute rewards to individual steps, and the breakdown becomes
pursuers receiving deterministic rewards from surrounding the
evader, and then random reward due to the evader moving after.
Removing this random component of the reward (the part caused
by the evaders action after the pursuers had already moved), should
then lead to superior performance. In this case the problem was so
innocuous that fixing it required switching two lines of code where
their order made no obvious difference. Bugs of this family could
easily happen in almost any MARL environment, and analyzing
and preventing them is made much easier with the AEC games
model.
We validated this experimentally by training parameter shared
Ape-X DQN [7] (the best performing model on pursuit [14]) four
times using RLLib [8] with and without the pruned reward, achiev-
ing better results with reward pruning every time and 18.3% more
total reward on average. Results with PPO are included in Appen-
dix B. Saved trained policies, training logs, and all code needed
to reproduce the experiments is available at https://github.com/
aecgames/aecgames.
5 CASE STUDY 2: RACE CONDITIONS IN
SEQUENTIAL SOCIAL DILEMMA GAMES
A very common scenario in multi-agent environments is for two
agents to be able to take conflicting actions (i.e. occupy the same
space). This discrepancy has to be resolved by the environment
(i.e. collision handling); here we call this “tie-breaking.” In an en-
vironment’s code, in general, every agent will step according to
some sort of internal agent order in an environment. Ensuring tie-
breaking is not biased towards agents earlier in an internal agent
order is very hard in practice, and modeling environments with
biased tie-breaking as strictly simultaneous actions can be very
misleading.
Consider an environment with two agents, Alice and Bob, in
which Alice steps first and tie-breaking is biased in Alice’s favor. If
such an environment were assumed to have simultaneous actions,
then observations for both agents would be taken before either
acted, causing the observation Bob acts on to potentially no longer
be an accurate representation of the environment. This is also a
true race condition—the result of stepping through the environ-
ment can inadvertently differ depending on the internal resolution
order of agent actions. In scenarios where it makes sense to do so,
adding observation delay makes this problem go away. Otherwise,
sequentially handling observations and actions (modeling the en-
vironment as an AEC game) is the sensible way to solve this, and
using APIs based around AEC games has the benefit of being able
to prevent subtle bugs of this variety.
A real world example of a major MARL environment with a
parallel API and inadvertently imperfect tie-breaking is the cleanup
environment in the open source implementation [16] of the Sequen-
tial Social Dilemma Games from ? ].
The Sequential Social Dilemma Games are a set of MARL envi-
ronments where good short-term strategies for single agents lead
to bad long-term results for all of the agents. The states of these
games are represented by a grid of tiles, where each tile represents
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Figure 4: Learning on the pursuit environment with and without pruned rewards, using parameter sharing based on Ape-X
DQN (the current state of the art method for the environment). This shows an average of an 18.3% improvement by using this
method.
either an agent or a piece of the environment. In the Cleanup en-
vironment, the environment tiles can be empty tiles, river tiles,
and apple tiles. Collecting apple tiles results in a reward for the
agent and the agents must clean the river tiles with a âĂĲcleaning
beamâĂİ for apple tiles to spawn. The cleaning beam extends from
agents as depicted in [6c].
The agents act sequentially in the same order every turn, includ-
ing the firing of their beams. In the case of two agents trying to
occupy the same space, one is chosen randomly, however the tie
breaking with regards to the beams is biased. due to a bug. Consider
the setup in Figure 5 where each agent chooses the âĂĲcleanâĂİ
action for the next step. This results in Agent 1 firing their cleaning
beam first, clearing the close river tile. Next, Agent 2 fires their
cleaning beam and they are able to clean the far river tile because
the close tile has already been cleared by Agent 1. However, if we
keep the same placement and actions but switch the labels of the
agents, we get a different result, seen in Figure 6. Now, Agent 1
fires first and hits the close river tile and can no longer reach the
far river tile. In situations like these, the observation the second
agent’s policy is using to act on is going to be inherently wrong,
and if it had the true environment state before acting it would very
likely wish to make a different choice.
This is a serious class of bug that’s very easy to introduce when
using parallel action-based APIs, and using AEC games-based APIs
prevents the class entirely. In this case the bug had gone unnoticed
for years, and was both very subtle and serious.
6 CYCLICALLY EXPANSIVE CURRICULUM
LEARNING
Curriculum learning is a technique where progressively more com-
plicated mechanics are added to an environment to make it easier
to learn very complex behaviors [1]. Doing this is almost always
helpful, but it can be very challenging to implement in practice
because it typically requires making large changes to the environ-
ment (which in the case of things like Atari ROMs cannot be easily
altered).
As noted in section 5, in the paradigm of AEC games, there is a
reward for all agents after each agent action. In the case of Agent
1 in Figure 7, suppose that we initially consider only the reward
received from its immediate turn. Then, the policy learner will be
limited to the information emitted from Agent 1’s immediate action.
However, if we consider the rewards emitted from Agent 1’s and
also Agent 2’s turn, we would effectively increase the information
and reward complexity for the policy learner. If we continue in
this manner and progressively consider rewards from agent actions
later in the cycle, then we have a rather natural form of curriculum
learning that can be easily applied to any environment without
changing any internal code. We termed this cyclically expansive
curriculum learning.
We corroborated the benefit of curriculum learning by compar-
ing the performance of PPO in the pursuit environment with and
without curriculum learning. We ran each approach four times
with RLLib [8] and achieved 35.1% more total reward on average
runs shown in Figure 8. Results for ApeX DQN on pursuit are also
included in Appendix B. Ape-X DQN was chosen because it per-
formed the best on pursuit in Terry et al. [14], and PPO was chosen
due to it’s widespread popularity as a general purpose deep RL
method. The code, logs, and saved policies for all experiments for
this are available at https://github.com/aecgames/aecgames.
This optimization could be applied via a very simple wrapper for
any environment, making this a nearly “free” method of curriculum
learning to use in any scenario, though it could only be reasonably
applied to an environment with an AEC games based API as a POSG
based API wouldn’t expose the needed rewards.
Agent 1
Agent 2
River Tiles
(a) The initial setup with two agents and two river tiles.
Cleaning
Beam Tiles
Agent 1
Agent 2
(b) The resulting state after both agents perform the âĂĲcleanâĂİ ac-
tion. Both river tiles are reached by the cleaning beam.
Figure 5: Cleanup, a Sequential Social Dilemma Game
from Vinitsky et al. [16].
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced the AEC games model, an alternative
to the dominant POSG model with sequential stepping, which we
argue is more reflective of real games in MARL while being equally
powerful mathematically. We present a major learning inefficiency
in section 4 and present a significant bug in the pursuit environment
in section 5, both of which are illustrative of large subtle issues
that can occur in nearly any MARL environment. Both problems
stemmed from treating the environment has a POSG with agents
stepping fully in parallel when this was not quite the case, and
despite being very subtle were more reasonably understandable
from the lens of AEC games. Motivated by this, and the ease of
cleanly modeling both strictly turn based games and those where
agents truly step in parallel, we argue that the model of AEC games
is often a superior model in multi-agent reinforcement learning.
Agent 2
Agent 1
(a) The same setup as in the previous figure, but with the agent labels
reversed.
Agent 2
Agent 1
(b) The result of both agents performing the âĂĲcleanâĂİ action, but
with this agent assignment, the far river tile is not cleaned.
Figure 6: The impact of switching the internal agent order
on how the environment evolves.
Perhaps the greatest testament to the AEC games model is it
serves as the basis of a remarkably clean API for PettingZoo [13],
which includes the largest and most diverse collection of multi-
agent environments ever under one API. The clean modeling of
so many games is something no library has ever been able to do
before.
We additionally use AEC games to pose a newmethod of curricu-
lum learning we term “cyclically expansive curriculum learning”
that can be implemented for any MARL environment via a simple
environment wrapper, and show it to improve performance in the
pursuit environment by 35.1% on average.
The one limitation we are aware of with our model is that, when
an environment is truly a perfect POSG, the performance charac-
teristics of certain environments can may it such that POSG based
APIs are much faster than with AEC games APIs (though we hope
Agent 1
Environment
Agent 2
Environment
Figure 7: A diagram of the cyclically expansive curriculum
learning scheme: each agent takes reward from the agent
that acts after them, and slowly begins adding that of other
agents.
this work gives insight into how to ensure those environments are
true POSGs).
Several options for future exploration remain. We feel that the
most interesting are to seek out new flaws this model elucidates in
other large MARL works, to explore the utility of cyclically expan-
sive curriculum learning in more general cases, and to explore using
AEC games as an more wieldly alternative to extensive form games
in theoretical MARL research. We hope the model of AEC games
stays in researchers’ “back pockets,” allowing them an alternative
perspective to find new and unknown things about environments
during the course of MARL and multi-agent systems research.
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A CONVERSION OF AEC GAMES TO POSGS
As a warm up, we first show this only for the case of deterministic
rewards.
Definition 3. An AEC Game
G = ⟨S,N , {Ai }, {Ti }, P , {Ri }, {Ωi }, {Oi },ν⟩
is said to have deterministic rewards if for all i, j ∈ Ξ, all a ∈ Aj , and
all s, s ′ ∈ S, there exists a R∗i (s, j,a, s ′) such that Ri (s, j,a, s ′, r ) = 1
for r = R∗i (s, j,a, s ′) (and 0 for all other r ).
Notice that an AEC Game with deterministic rewards may still
depend on the new state s ′ which can itself be stochastic in the
case of the environment (j = 0).
Theorem 2. Every AEC Game with deterministic rewards has an
equivalent POSG.
Proof. Suppose G = ⟨S,N , {Ai }, {Ti }, P , {Ri }, {Ωi }, {Oi },ν⟩
is an AEC game with deterministic rewards. We define GPOSG =
⟨S′,N , {Ai }, P ′, {R′i }, {Ωi }, {Oi }⟩ as follows.
• S′ = S × Ξ
• P ′((s, i),a1, . . . ,aN , (s ′, i ′)) = ν (s, i,ai , s ′, i ′) · Pr(s ′ | s, i,ai ),
where
Pr(s ′ | s, i,ai ) =

1 if i > 0 and T (s,ai ) = s ′
P(s, s ′) if i = 0
0 o/w (i.e., if i = 0 and T (s,ai ) , s ′)
• R′i ((s, j),a, (s ′, j ′)) = R∗i (s, j,a, s ′)
In this construction, the new state in the POSG encodes information
about which agent is meant to act. State transitions in the POSG
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Figure 8: Learning on the pursuit environment with and without curriculum learning, using parameter sharing based on PPO.
Curriculum learning increased the total reward by 35.1% on average.
therefore encode both the state transition of the original AEC game
and the transition for determining the next agent to act. In each
step, the state transition depends only on the agent who’s turn it is
to act (which is included as part of the state).
This construction adapts POSGs to be strictly turn-based so that
it is able to represent AEC Games. □
We now present the full proof.
Theorem 3. Every AEC Game has an equivalent POSG.
Proof. Suppose G = ⟨S,N , {Ai }, {Ti }, P , {Ri }, {Ωi }, {Oi },ν⟩
is an AEC game with R being the (finite) set of all possible rewards.
We define GPOSG = ⟨S′,N , {Ai }, P ′, {R′i }, {Ωi }, {Oi }⟩ as follows.
• S′ = S ×Ξ×RN . An element of S′ is a tuple (s, i, r), where
r = (r1, r2, . . . , rN ) is a vector of rewards for each agent.
• P ′((s, i, r),a1,a2, . . . ,aN , (s ′, i ′, r′)) = ν (s, i,ai , s ′, i ′) Pr(s ′ |
s, i,ai )∏j ∈[N ] Rj (s, i,ai , s ′, r′i ), where
Pr(s ′ | s, i,ai ) =

1 if i > 0 and T (s,ai ) = s ′
P(s, s ′) if i = 0
0 o/w (i.e., if i = 0 and T (s,ai ) , s ′)
• R′i ((s, j, r),a, (s ′, j ′, r′)) = r′i
□
B ADDITIONAL REWARD PRUNING AND
CURRICULUM LEARNING RESULTS
We ran PPO on pursuit with and without reward pruning. The total
reward average for 4 runs increased by 5.4% with pruned rewards
compared to unpruned rewards.
We included results for ApeX DQN on pursuit with curriculum
learning. The total reward average for 4 runs increased by 13.2%
after implementing curriculum learning.
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Figure 9: Learning on the pursuit environment with and without reward pruning, using parameter sharing based on PPO.
Reward pruning increased the total reward by 5.4% on average.
10k 20k 30k 40k 50k
Episode
4
5
6
7
8
9
Av
er
ag
e
To
ta
lR
ew
ar
d
Pursuit
Regular 1
Regular 2
Regular 3
Regular 4
Curriculum Learning 1
Curriculum Learning 2
Curriculum Learning 3
Curriculum Learning 4
Figure 10: Learning on the pursuit environment with and without curriculum learning, using parameter sharing based on
ApeX DQN. Curriculum learning increased the total reward by 13.2% on average.
